I INTRODUCTION
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The underlying question presented in this article is whether the strong, hegemonic nations have set a certain path that results in a paradigm such that other nations are under some influence to survive by adaptation. In particular, this article proposes that the investment settlement system has presented a mutation in the system in the form of the recently proposed international investment court. This 'court' was created and endorsed by hegemonic states and economic unions, such as the EU and Canada. One of the theories considered in this article is whether other Asia-Pacific states, like Vietnam and recently Singapore as well as Mexico, are 'adapting' to the model of hegemonic states, and why they do so. Unlike Darwin's theory relating to species which unconsciously follow an evolutionary path, states maintain a greater degree of autonomy to choose to follow a certain path. As such, other states like Australia may adapt due to competitive pressure, the virtues or merits of the design of the investment court, or a combination of each.
With case examples to offer context, this article evaluates whether a permanent international investment 'court', such as that proposed under the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and by the EU under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), contributes to consistency and the rule of law. In particular, this article identifies certain adequacies and inadequacies of that system in the context of an evolutionary institutional shift from the existing model based on private contract-based arbitration to that of a public 'court'. Will this model result in an elevated standard of jurisprudence of international investment law, or just similar circular outcomes? The standard of review of this 'court' could just as equally promote a divergence, rather than a convergence, of international investment norms. Ultimately, any convergence between domestic and international legal norms is regulated by the reciprocal standard of deference and the willingness of states to consent to a particular investment treaty standard.
Before addressing the design and the impact of an international investment court, Part I of this article considers a specific phenomenon of a perpetual engagement and potential competition of the jurisdiction between the local judiciary and investment tribunals. This section discusses the Chevron/Ecuador dispute that once emanated from a local court and permeated to various international tribunals and other domestic courts. It is proposed that this case serves as a benchmark (or the scientific control) to measure whether the investment court will improve the overall investment system, specifically in terms of consistency, predictability and accountability.
Part II provides the empirical basis to 'judge the judges of the judiciary'. In particular, it reviews the methodological framework as to how investment tribunals review the judicial determinations and procedures, focusing on both the general level of deference accorded to courts and the standard of legal review for specific investment obligations. Part III analyses how this existing framework is likely to impact Australia's judicial system and how this may change with its adoption of the proposed investment court design.
As such, Part IV outlines the features of the international investment court model as far as they are relevant to consistency, legitimacy and accountability. This section then analyses whether the model court system (with an appeal mechanism) on a multilateral level will likely unify and improve the standard of review, and whether that optimises the operation of the international investment regime as a whole.
This article concludes that there are a variety of existing legal standards and interminable ways of framing an investment claim, in the absence of limiting language in the investment treaty. This article further concludes that there are certain features or (in biological terms) 'traits' that are beneficial to the investment court system, but it remains to be seen whether these will truly unify the legal standards of the investment system and indeed, if so, whether this will result in a stable and predictable relationship between courts and tribunals. Consistent standards at the international level may act as a catalyst by providing the necessary foundation on which both domestic courts (that support the international arbitral process and enforce the final award) and international tribunals to reciprocally develop a degree of deference or reliance. This article also concludes, however, that as long as ISDS is fundamentally constituted from its contractual/consensual-based ancestry, its evolutionary potential to be a 'public' court in the true sense is somewhat limited.
II PART I: THE CHEVRON/ECUADOR PHENOMENON
In the current international investment system, there is a constant judicial interaction by a review of legal norms, both substantive and procedural, between investment tribunals and domestic courts. Domestic courts also function to support international arbitrations. First, courts can provide interim relief or other measures that support the arbitration Second, domestic courts support the final product of the process, by enforcing the arbitral award pertaining to its territorial jurisdiction. 9 The quality of review by the international tribunal of the domestic judiciary will often depend on the jurisdiction of the tribunal (set by the arbitration agreement between the parties) and reciprocally, the quality of review of the domestic court will depend on the law of that state, and whether that court acts in the capacity of the place of arbitration (lex arbitri) or the place of enforcement.
10
A The Phenomenon of the Potentially Perpetual Loop: Are we Chasing Our Tail?
An interesting phenomenon occurs where the investment tribunal reviews the legal norms, both substantive and procedural, of domestic judicial systems. Conceptually, one could anticipate that the current design provides for a perpetual loop of judging other judgments, like a dog chasing its own tail. The process is initiated such that the domestic judicial system or its resulting judgment becomes the subject of jurisdiction and determination by an investment tribunal. The investment tribunal produces an award containing a legal standard as to the adequacy of the domestic court process or the substantive legal standard. The legal standard applied by the investment tribunal can vary, depending on the compromis, the governing law and legal standard provided in the investment treaty, as well as the appetite of the tribunal to enunciate a legal standard.
11 The final investment award is then reviewed by a domestic judicial system, either to the court of the lex arbitri to set aside an award (or part of it) or to a court to support the enforcement of the award. In both cases, the domestic court will likely review the jurisdiction and appropriateness of the decision of the international tribunal (including the ground of 'public policy' 8 For example, courts of states that are signatories to the New York Convention are required to enforce international arbitration agreements pursuant to Article II of the New York Convention, and through the adoption of Indeed, the ongoing Chevron/Ecuador dispute is to a large extent an empirical illustration of this phenomenon of interacting domestic and international judicial systems and legal norms.
B From Local to International Judiciary, and Back Again
The Chevron dispute originated as a local court action to determine the liability for the clean-up of oil pollution in the Oriente region of the Amazon following Texaco's drilling operations from the 1970s. 13 In 1993, 1
Legitimacy of the Process
The question arises as to what the appropriate standing or the right of audience ought to be for stakeholders that are not parties, and whether it should be different between international tribunals and domestic courts. For example, it appears that throughout the Chevron ISDS dispute, the Lago Agrio people had no standing, yet Chevron was able to participate in the IACHR proceedings, and similarly Ecuador was able to participate in the enforcement proceedings before the domestic court. Legitimacy questions arise with respect to this asymmetry. It may be that investment tribunals are hesitant to give credence to non-party submissions in the absence of any expressly enabling language in the treaty that establishes its jurisdiction to do so. As such, the ability for a non-party to provide submissions by amicus curiae is often the subject of discretion by an investment tribunal and seldom denoted as being the subject of the tribunal's reasons in the award. 50 The question becomes whether such discretionary offers of standing to non-disputing parties is legitimate or appropriate. On the one hand, providing unfettered discretion may interfere and undermine the primary objective of the ISDS process, namely to expeditiously interpret a treaty containing the host state's legal obligations. 51 One the other hand, interpreting obligations often require consideration of its impact on the rights and expectations of other stakeholders (particularly in the case of party litigants of the underlying local court determination), as well as a state's sovereignty and right to regulate at international law.
2

Scope of Asymmetrical Relief to Investors
Second, a related issue concerns the scope of remedies available to an investor. While the ultimate remedy for an investor is damages, an investment tribunal is charged with jurisdiction to authorise interim injunctive relief. 53 Remedies of damages and interim stays are asymmetrical in the sense that they are ordinarily not available to the respondent state, such as Ecuador, or to non-party stakeholders.
54
Framed in this manner, providing a foreign investor with the exclusive ability to obtain an award for a stay of enforcement of a court judgment is likely to be perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the international/domestic interactive system. 56 Such arguments have been raised in the context of the notion of 'regulatory chill', yet an argument could be made that the risk of direct action by investors against a state could even be prudent for a state's (particularly for developing state's) regulatory framework, and thus global administrative law generally. Such states benefit from its embrace of international investment standards such as fairness and a reasonable expectation of a predictable investment environment and that these standards prevent sudden reversals of (politicallybased) policies that expose both foreign investors and local nationals to harm. Indeed, legitimacy is particularly sensitive in the case vulnerable non-parties being faced with international awards that significantly affect or nullify the result of the underlying court proceedings that they were privy to.
3
Standard of Deference and Review
Third, is the question of the overall level of deference an investment tribunal should accord to the local courts that made the underlying determination. For the purposes of this article, the standard of review refers to the degree of scrutiny of the judgment by an adjudicator in relation to the evaluation of facts and law and the standard of deference refers to the general degree of restraint an adjudicator exercises, or level of interference, when performing such an evaluation. 57 Should the level of deference vary according to the standard of the judicial system, and how (and by whom) should this level of deference be judged? It seems fair to assume that if various tribunals applied various standards of deference, it would result in an uncertain and inconsistent process. On the other hand, it is difficult to establish from the outset a standard of review for each investment obligation that relates to domestic judicial determinations. Indeed, the jurisdiction of each investment tribunal is constrained by the language of the treaty that is the subject of interpretation. It would appear that the treaty language and the application of the rules on treaty interpretation are the foundations for consistency.
4
Searching for a Solution to the Phenomenon
To the extent that any domestic court process or judgment becomes subject to review by an international tribunal, this can create a paradigm of a perpetual loop of disputes between domestic courts and international tribunals. For example, if an investor receives a successful award (based on the judicial irregularities of a local court) that is ultimately set aside by the court at the lex arbitri, the process or judgment of that latter court may in turn become reviewable by a second investor-state tribunal. This is more probable when the investor is part of a chain in a multinational corporate structure. 58 There are several techniques to limit the scope or mitigate the risk of this phenomenon, focusing on the jurisdiction of both the investment tribunal and the domestic court. In addition to prescribing the rationae materaie and rationae personae of the investment treaty, the types of disputes involving a domestic judiciary could be circumscribed, as well as the associated legal standard for each type of dispute. Similarly, the scope of jurisdiction of the domestic court reviewing the decision of the international tribunal could be constrained, guided by the general level of deference accorded to an international tribunal and the legal standard relating to the court's review function. These can vary significantly depending on the domestic laws of the particular state in which the arbitration is conducted (the lex arbitri) and the place of enforcement.
This dynamic and interactive system can be identified as a 'constitution' in the sense of 'check and balances' between international and domestic legal norms. However, it should be noted that refining the system by these techniques is unlikely to have an immediate effect. The domestic/international legal systems are interdependent and largely reciprocal, whereby achieving a degree of consistent reliance, comity or deference is a slowing evolving process. In scenarios of various jurisdiction overlaps with unpredictable or unfettered standards of review, this is likely to create a somewhat 'unstable' system, undermining any efforts of reciprocal deference (or 'trust') between international investment tribunals and domestic courts. An untrusting relationship would thereby maintain a spiraling process of tribunal and court determinations that undermine the legitimacy of the system and rule of law. The following parts of this article addresses whether this system is optimized by creating a front-end standard of review that subsequent tribunals and courts readily defer to. Namely, whether the establishment of an investment tribunal that operates with the traditional features a 'court' can assist with consistency and rule of law.
III PART II: THE DIVERGENCE OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
This section analyses the legal standards that investment tribunals have applied specifically in the context of reviewing the judicial process of the host state and judgments made by it. The findings demonstrate that the standard is not consistently applied. This could be attributed to the difference in the specific language of the investment obligation contained in the treaty, together with the context of the treaty itself, 59 but likely due to the divergence of approaches by a tribunal when interpreting the same or similar provisions. While this section focusses on the judicial system of the host state, it is relevant to note that in the broader context, international tribunals do often review the systems and standards of quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals. respects. In Eli Lilly, the tribunal focused on a law of general application, and how the legal standard changed and varied to the law of other states. 63 In contrast, in Arif, the issue the subject of dispute was with respect to how the domestic law was applied by a court in a specific instance.
In Eli Lilly v Canada, Eli claimed that a dramatic change in the patent law by Canadian courts amounted to a new standard. The alleged new standard was a change in the scope of the 'utility' standard under Canadian patent law. 64 The Arif v Moldovia case raised questions as to about whether a Moldovan court decision amounted to a denial of justice. This was with respect to both an alleged misapplication of law by the courts (namely, the validity and legal rights accorded by a lease) 65 (substantive aspect), and a collusion by the courts and a fair opportunity to defend itself (procedural aspect).
66
These two cases demonstrate the divergence in standards or norms applied between investment tribunals.
1
Arif v Moldovia-Moldovan Court Applying Law Correctly?
The Arif dispute was brought under the France-Moldova bilateral investment treaty (BIT), following a judgment by the Moldovan court that agencies of the executive branch had illegally granted exclusive rights to Franck Arif (a French national) to operate duty-free shops at the Chisnau airport. 67 The Moldovan courts determined that Moldovan airport officials had failed to follow the required competitive tender processes, which had prevented Arif's competitor (who brought the underlying case) from having a fair opportunity to compete for the same concession.
68
In the tribunal's ruling, it noted that the Moldovan courts 'applied Moldovan law legitimately and in good faith', 69 giving Arif a 'fair opportunity' to present his case. 70 As to the grounds of a substantive denial of justice, the tribunal determined that even if the Moldovan court's reasoning could have been less formalistic, it was 'carefully drafted' and could be followed throughout.
71
The tribunal also determined that there were two bases of a claim by an investor for denial of justice-namely the customary obligations of denial of justice and obligations under investment protection treaties. 72 It noted, 'that international law allows a free-standing claim for denial of justice' 73 and 'there is certainly and inevitably a continuous 'crosspollination' between the two [types of claims], but they remain distinct and specific.
74
Elaborating on the customary international law standard, the tribunal stated that it amounts to 'an outrage, bad faith, willful neglect of duty, or insufficiency of actions apparent to any unbiased man'. 75 The specific restrictive appraisal of judicial acts was owed to the 'political and By contrast, the tribunal determined that the FET standard will be breached by the judicial organ of the state in the event of 'fundamentally unfair proceedings and outrageously wrong, final and binding decisions' 77 with errors that amount to a 'manifest disrespect of due process', 78 and errors as to the substantive law to 'such a degree to be so egregiously wrong that no competent and honest court would use them.'
79
The Arif tribunal did accord to the domestic judiciary much deference and delineated the roles of international tribunals and domestic courts, stating:
80
[I]nternational tribunals must refrain from playing the role of ultimate appellate courts. They cannot substitute their own application and interpretation of national law to the application by national courts. It would blur the necessary distinction between the hierarchy of instances within the national judiciary and the role of international tribunals if "[a] simple difference of opinion on the part of the international tribunal is enough" to allow a finding that a national court has violated international law. The opinion of an international tribunal that it has a better understanding of national law than the national court and that the national court is in error, is not enough. Ultimately, the tribunal also found that the inconsistency between the Moldovan court's ruling and an earlier Moldovan tribunal determination in favour of the investor's concession to operate the duty-free shop, contributed to a violation of the treaty's FET standard. [T]he Tribunal is unwilling to shut the door to the possibility that judicial conduct characterized other than as a denial of justice may engage a respondent's obligations under NAFTA Article 1105, within the standard articulated in the award in Glamis. The tribunal did not articulate a legal standard for expropriation by the judiciary. It did note that 'decisions of the national judiciary, the interplay between obligations under NAFTA Articles 1105(1) and 1110 will be a matter for careful assessment in any given case'.
89
As for the general standard of deference, the tribunal stated that:
90
[A] tribunal is not an appellate tier in respect of the decisions of the national judiciary. It is not the task of a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal to review the findings of national courts and considerable deference is to be accorded to the conduct and decisions of such courts. It will accordingly only be in very exceptional circumstances, in which there is clear evidence of egregious and shocking conduct, that it will be appropriate for a…tribunal to assess such conduct against the obligations of the respondent State under NAFTA Article 1105(1)
B Summary of Analysis
The following can be summarised on the basis of the analysis and reasoning by the investor-state tribunal.
1
Two Grounds of Denial of Justice
The Arif investment tribunal found there to be two denial of justice standards, a customary international law standard and an autonomous FET standard. Where the customary international law standard must unfairness are capable, as a matter of hypothesis, of attaching to the conduct or decisions of courts. It follows, in the Tribunal's view, that a claimed breach of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment requirement of NAFTA Article 1105(1) may be properly a basis for a claim under NAFTA Article 1105 notwithstanding that it is not cast in denial of justice terms' 89 '[T]he Tribunal notes that NAFTA Article 1110(1)(c) includes the requirement that…the nationalization or expropriation of an investment must be "in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1)". As regards decisions of the national judiciary, the interplay between obligations under NAFTA Articles 1105(1) and 1110 will be a matter for careful assessment in any given case, subject to the controlling appreciation that a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier with a mandate to review the decisions of the national judiciary. ' standard could be better articulated and leaves various judicial actions the subject of debate as to whether it could be categorised by such conduct.
Similarly, in Eli Lilly, the tribunal also recognized that two standards existed, stating that it is 'unwilling to shut the door' to the possibility that judicial conduct can be characterized other than as a denial of justice under NAFTA Article 1105.
2
Judicial Expropriation-Another Door Left Open Further, in Eli Lilly the NAFTA tribunal appeared to recognise that an incorrect judgment (founded on an incorrect standard) could amount to a breach of the investment obligation of expropriation. 94 Fundamentally, however, an international standard was not fully articulated by the investment tribunal, in order to guide investors and states as to the scope of the obligation.
General Deference-Very General
In both cases the respective tribunal did not completely and definitely articulate a general standard of deference to prescribe, or proscribe, the degree of discretion should be provided to a domestic court. Each tribunal merely provided some indicative limits. The Arif tribunal stated that a 'simple difference of opinion is not enough', 95 whereas the Eli Lilly tribunal merely indicated that 'considerable deference is to be accorded' to the decisions of local court. 99 Yet in a recent wave of investment disputes, the grounds of review have now evolved such that the substantive domestic law has formed the subject to review.
C Determinations by other International Tribunals as to Judicial Conduct
100
As such, while the early international disputes were grounded in the customary international legal standard, the treaty law on foreign investments has changed by the proliferation of numerous investment treaties since the 1960's. This has given way to various treaty grounds, with various legal standards deriving from each ground, which appear to be still evolving. Just as the grounds are not showing any indication of being closed, the legal standards derived from such grounds are not demonstrating any sign of convergence.
Appendix A illustrates the variation in the types of claim, the legal standard applied and the general standard of deference provided to domestic judicial systems. The disputes considered as part of that analysis are not exhaustive, however this provides an adequate sample to demonstrate the variation in legal standards and the bases of claim. 101 Further, Table 1 (below) provides a summary as to how these investment tribunals framed the claim brought by the foreign investor and the legal standard applied to judicial measures. With the recent emergence of novel claims based on substantive standards by the domestic judicial system (contrasted to procedural conduct), it is conceivable that additional claims are on the horizon. For example, an investor could viably argue that a local domestic court ought to accord national treatment to an investor as a court applicant/defendant, such that a specific, more favourable legal standard that is applied across that judicial system (possibly based on different category or field of law).
103
The scope of the treatment (legal standard) accorded to the investor would likely depend on the scope of the 'in like circumstances' qualifier often pertaining to the national treatment obligation, which varies from one investment treaty to the next. 104 Compounded with the application of an MFN clause, this is likely to augment the list of potential comparative legal standards that are contained in other investment treaties that state is privy to. Similarly, there is scope to argue that the obligation of providing investors with 'effective means' to assert legal claims could extend to a requirement that the local judiciary establish a domestic law or legal standard that is somewhat consistent with third-party states.
In the absence of any attempts to curtail the expansion of international standards and claims, such arguments remain to be tested in the international investment regime. 
IV PART III: IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM: PHILIP MORRIS UNDER A NEW GUISE
This section addresses the impact of imprecise legal standards on Australia's judiciary, as a prelude to the consideration of those investment court traits that could affect Australia and its general outlook in the international investment regime. Currently, Australia is exposed to claims brought by investors that were unsuccessful litigants before the local judicial system. It is also on the receiving end of the divergent legal standards and grounds of an investment claim. It is uncertain whether Australia will aspire to adopt an institution such as a multilateral investment court with the allure of a globally standardised rules-based institution. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that Australia has switched its position as to the inclusion of ISDS arbitration in its BITs and FTAs especially over the last 15 years.
A Australia in the Global Political Economy
In terms of hegemonic power and position in the global political economy, Australia can be perceived to be a county that is 'stuck in the middle' of influencing an institution such as a multilateral investment court.
106 Australia may have some innate desire to participate in the design of a multilateral investment court based on the merits of advancing consistent and predictable rules-based investment system, similar to the WTO. In addition, Australia may also be under some influence to adapt to tribunal's appetite to entertain a particularly framed basis of claim, exposes the Australian judicial system to be the subject of review with relative uncertainty as to the outcome of dispute. This begs the question as to whether Australia ought to adopt a prudent proactive (rather than reactive) approach by clarifying and constructively delineating the standard of review and level of deference accorded to Australian courts.
B The Philip Morris Example-A Close Call?
The exposure of Australian courts could be readily identified with respect to the recent Philip Morris v Australia dispute. Australia was recently subject of an ISDS claim brought by Philip Morris. Philip Morris framed its claim as one of a contravention of Australia's obligations under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, namely expropriation and FET, by proscribing colours and design features, and other intellectual property rights on cigarette packages through 'plain packaging laws'. 114 The claim brought against Australia was denied at the jurisdiction stage, on the basis of that Philip Morris' changed in corporate structure in order to gain the protection of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, which ultimately constituted an abuse of process.
115
Philip Morris, with other tobacco companies, also brought a contemporaneous parallel challenge in the High Court, alleging that the legislation violated the Australian Constitution by acquiring their intellectual property without compensation on just terms. 117 To make the High Court judgment the subject of the arbitration, however, Philip Morris would be requires to amend its claim or commence another arbitration. Indeed, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia stated that '[I]t is possible that the tribunal, in the context of an argument about expropriation, might be asked to form a view about the correctness of the High Court's conclusion that there was no acquisition within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. There are therefore two issues of general significance illuminated by this particular case -the use of ISDS to challenge legislative and administrative acts by maintain a claim that the standard of expropriation applied by the High Court ought to be consistent with Australia's obligation of expropriation under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT. With this exposure of its judicial system in mind, it may be prudent for Australia to consider achieving consistency through the proposed investment court model and digress from its current ad hoc approach of including/excluding ISDS in BITs and FTAs, 118 in an attempt to curb any significant divergence of international legal standards. Indeed, the following section of this article analyses the design of the investment court model proposed by Canada and European Union, and the implications of this design for states such as Australia. 
V PART IV: THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT-TRAITS WORTH SELECTING FOR?
This section will analyse how the proposed 'investment court' will likely impact the existing system of divergent and imprecise international standards. It outlines the design of the investment court that are pertinent for this discussion, then considers whether such traits attempt to seriously curtail the 'Chevron/Ecuador phenomenon' of indeterminate interactions of international and domestic legal norms and overlaps that was discussed in Part I. Namely, this section addresses whether the features of the court contributes to improving reliability of the legal standards and the rule of law, and a promotes a willingness to comprehensively consider a broader framing of issues and stakeholder impacts beyond a mere interpretation of investment obligations contained in the treaty.
In light of the foreseeable enactment of a bilateral investment court under the CETA and EU-Vietnam FTA, 124 and the EU's recent step to negotiate a convention establishing a multilateral court, 125 the comments made in this section concentrate on the envisioned multilateral court model proposed by the European Union and Canada. press/index.cfm?id=1608 >; The EU declared that its proposed investment court system is a stepping-stone toward a future multilateral dispute settlement mechanism. The idea is to integrate the EU's appellate mechanism into 'multiple agreements and between different partners... on the basis of an opt-in system' to eventually replace all investment dispute resolution mechanisms in EU deals. 126 For a more comprehensive review of the investment court system and how that court Using the CETA investment court as a basis, 127 the following features are relevant to this discussion: 1. Permanent judges, not Party-Appointed-The court consists of a standing roster of 15 judges, of which three are selected and appointed by the 'President' of the tribunal for each claim that is commenced by the investor. 128 The standing roster will consist of five judges of EU, five of Canadian nationality, and the other five of another nationality. 129 Neither the investor nor respondent directly select an arbitrator or judge of their choice. The judges will be paid a monthly retainer fee, and the disputing parties will be required to contribute to these costs on an equal basis; 130 2. Interim Relief-There is an express declaration that the tribunal may provide a remedy of interim relief; 131 3. Other Stakeholder Interests-There is an express declaration that non-state entities may submit briefs to the judges of the court if they raise issues that are 'directly relevant' to the dispute before the tribunal; 6. 'Self-Enforcing' Awards-The investment court process provides its own self-enforcement mechanism, and incorporates the same grounds to annul or set aside the award as those prescribed under Article 52 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention);
139
In addition, the CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA mandates that the parties pursue the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism.
140
With the amalgamation of all of these features, the investment court model represents a paradigm shift, from the traditional model, that was largely 141 based on private contractual arbitration, to one of a 'public court'. 142 Namely, in essence, the model removes from the disputing parties the ability to appoint decision-makers directly; provides improved guidance for the participation by other parties that may have an interest in the outcome of the dispute; provides express exceptions of general application with prescriptive language that are orientated for the benefit of a state to regulate public policies; 143 adopts an appeal mechanism to improve the consistency of the determinations made; 144 system's reliance on domestic courts to enforce awards by way of the enforcement obligations contained within the treaty. The multilateral design of the investment court is somewhat unresolved. The model appears to be one of an 'opt in' system for other states, such that parties elect to be bound by way of a separate treaty, 145 presumably like the ICSID Convention. Questions remain as to how a multilateral court will function. For example, a fundamental question remains as to how the tribunals of each tier of the investment court (the first instance and appeal tribunal) are designed to make consistent determinations based on various treaties with separate language, context and purpose. This is unlike the design of the WTO, where the appeal tribunal is would be structured to correct underlying tribunal determinations that are based on one treaty that 164 states are members of, 146 namely the WTO Agreement. 147 By comparison, the ability of the investment court to ensure consistency through correctness of determinations by the appeal tribunal appears to be limited. Indeed, the following section considers whether the design of the investment court at a multilateral level will improve the predictability and legitimacy of both the determinations of the court and the underlying fundamental interactive relationship between international and domestic fora.
B 148 Under the multilateral court system, one tribunal of three panelist could determine that dispute. While different parties would invite dissimilar issues and based on diverse treaty texts, there would obviously be some efficiencies and benefits of economies of scale in resolving these disputes contemporaneously. However, ambiguity remains as to whether the awards will be binding, with no express mechanism to make awards binding on subsequent tribunals (at both the appellate and first-instance level) within the investment court system. 149 Yet there is a possibility that, despite the difference of treaty language, having different treaties interpreted by the same 15 members of the court could result in convergence, such that similar treaty obligations are interpreted similarly. Indeed, once a trend begins of some consistent interpretations by an investment court's appeal tribunal, other states may be inclined to amend the language of the treaty provisions in order to secure (or avoid) the same interpretation. As such, states would retain flexibility to draft treaty obligations based on a negotiation of only two or more parties (in comparison with a multilateral treaty with 164 members such as the WTO). Similarly, a state can 'wait and see' before determining what works for it before joining this multilateral system. Thus, from both substantive and procedural perspectives, states (both inside and outside the multilateral investment court system) can observe how investment obligations are being interpreted by the court and adjust the scope of their own treaty commitments accordingly.
In contrast, from the perspective of the investor, there is a shift in power with respect to the arbitral procedure, transferring from the private investor to the state. That is, the investor is now confronted with a 'take it or leave it' set of procedural rules that are generally not drafted in their direct interest. This contrasts to the traditional ISDS model, which provides more autonomy and (as such) symmetrically to each disputing party. From this perspective, the process appears to be more vulnerable to influence by non-disputing parties.
2
On the Road-Interaction with Other States
It is relevant to consider the broader impacts of the overall international investment regime in the context of the global political economy.
Fundamental questions arise as to whether this court system will evolve to an institution that results in a competitive contagious process set by a hegemon that other states are compelled to follow. 150 Namely, each state may face 'prisoner dilemma' on the basis of its desire to better compete for capital, 151 which may create a new form of path dependence resulting from the greater bargaining position of hegemons such as the EU and Canada. Indeed, this could create a newly evolved lineage, such that may find it prudent to adopt the investment court design in order to directly participate as the crafter and drafter of these institutional rules before the architecture is established to solely offer a 'take it or leave it' dichotomous choice of an established hegemonic model. 153 General patterns of divergence could emerge. It may result in various dissents and divergence by less-developed states, based on perceptions of the system's legitimacy, as was recently demonstrated by the denouncement of ICSID system by Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela and of ISDS generally by New Zealand. 154 Certain states may desire to start their own 'court' independent from that of the EU/Canada system. Other hegemons, particularly the United States and China, would likely baulk at this type of institution. 155 In this respect, any perception by states of maintaining a 'first-mover' advantage to tailor the interpretative and procedural rules could be quashed. States like Australia may opt instead to adopt a 'wait and see' approach and first determine whether to follow a pre-existing court design. Such an approach, however, has been discouraged (particularly for Australia and New Zealand), in favour of a state's ability to readily participate in the process in order to achieve or influence a balanced outcome, an outcome that may not be achieved through a multilateral process involving various hegemonic states with divergence interests.
3
What is Under the Hood-Is it a Court or an Arbitral Process?
Further, an investor's ability to enforce the award may be impaired. While the CETA text contains an obligation to enforce the award by the EU and Canada, the investor may look to enforce the award beyond these territories by utilising the New York Convention, depending on where the assets of the responding state are located. The New York Convention and accompanying UNCITRAL Model Law prescribes certain requirements as to the nature of the arbitration agreement and process. 157 Yet, given the language of the text is styled in such a manner to represent a court process, rather than an arbitration, 158 and a requirement of the investor to consent to the adoption of heavily prescribed procedural rules in a 'take or leave it' manner (rather than a design negotiated autonomously by the parties), this may undermine the ability to enforce the award outside the CETA territory. Indeed, some domestic courts, such as those in the United States and Canada, have set aside arbitration clauses on the basis of representing an unconscionable adhesion contract. 159 Similarly, there are constitutional issues to be resolved surrounding the consistency of the investment court design with the ICSID Convention. 160 Overall, this could result in an investor shying away of its willingness to undertake dispute settlement through the ICSID Convention.
Similarly, shifting to the ideal of a 'court', in the true sense of the term, is likely to be restrained by the jurisdiction of tribunal, where a determination of the issues involve the interests of a non-party (such as a litigant in the underlying court proceedings). International tribunals, like the International Court of Justice, are not charged with inherent jurisdiction similar to that of domestic courts, and are ordinarily constrained by the principle, pronounced by the Monetary Gold case, that a tribunal should not exercise jurisdiction if the subject matter of the decision would determine the rights and obligations of a state which is not a party to the proceedings. 162 Such jurisdictional restraints are relevant where there is an absence of consent by non-parties and where deciding on the subject matter of the case affects the rights of such non-parties (as an 'indispensable party'). 163 It is not clear whether the Monetary Gold principle applies in the context of investor-state arbitration. 164 Indeed,
Ecuador raised this principle in its argument objecting to jurisdiction in the Chevron dispute, and subsequently with respect to the merits, where the tribunal found that this did not preclude it from exercising its jurisdiction.
4
Is it a 'Good' Model?
Then there are fundamental questions of legitimacy. Indeed, what makes the appeal tribunal findings more 'correct' than those of the underlying panel or other tribunal panels constituted outside of the multilateral investment system? Legitimacy of a judicial system should not be inevitably equated to the consistency achieved through the correction of judgments. Certainly, the appeal tribunal will readily arrive at a different conclusion than that of other panels, and not necessarily because the underlying finding was 'wrong', but rather because the reviewing tribunal interprets the legal or factual findings differently. Indeed, the critics' narrative surrounding the legitimacy of the existing investment regime is based on the consistency, rather than the correctness, of tribunal determinations.
B Whether Prescribed Standards with Deference are Useful Traits
As such, assuming the promise of the investment court materialises and becomes prevalent, several general overall observations can be made as to the impact of this trajectory.
1
Prescribing the Standard of Review
We appear to be moving in a direction of reducing a private investor's 'second bite of the apple', by prescribing further limits on investor rights. Namely, the investment court attempts to prescribe the rights of an unsuccessful litigant, whom appeared before the local judiciary, in the capacity of an investor when the international tribunal reviews judgments on domestic legal norms. Substantively, these are prescribed through the incorporation of express general exceptions. Procedurally, there is greater potential for the standing of non-party stakeholders (previously determined on a discretionary basis) to influence the process and outcome. 167 Prescribing language for a standard of review is a challenging task. It is difficult to judge whether, for example, the Eli Lilly tribunal should have applied at the outset a standard of 'manifest unreasonableness', rather than 'reasonableness', contravened the international investment obligation of the minimum standard of treatment or expropriation, pertaining to the underlying judgment of the domestic court. 168 The question remains whether this evolutionary development will have consequences on the general deference, or 'trust', yielded between international and domestic tribunals.
The development represents two significant changes: the appearance of a public court (through the adoption of express public policy exceptions and the standing of other affected members), and a greater effort to achieve the consistency of legal determinations. It is not clear whether these traits will contribute to more deference being afforded to states, through its local judiciary, 169 and thereby generate more reciprocal reliance and trust between international tribunals and local courts. The constitution of the domestic legal system lends support to the argument that international tribunals should provide more deference to a local judiciary. 170 Domestic laws of states are usually embedded or loaded with their own inherent balance of multi-faceted obligations. 171 The domestic court's own system of balancing such obligation will depend on the right or interest in issue and the overall constitutional framework of the host state. For example, when domestic common law courts apply the tort of negligence to a specific factual scenario, in considering whether a duty of care was owed, that court already conducts the appropriate balancing exercise between the individual's right and the wider public interest. 172 Arguably, supplanting international investment norms into this analytical framework is likely to undermine that traditional balance. Yet, should the degree of deference that is proffered by international tribunals vary according to the perceived standard of the legal system or the type of domestic law? Namely, one could argue that international tribunals should accord more deference to a local judiciary where it perceives that the domestic legal system is developed to have already accorded a high-quality balancing analysis, particularly one with democratic accountability. 173 Similarly, the claim for greater deference could be stronger in cases where domestic courts adjudicate private rights between nationals, such as a tort or transaction, when compared to legal issues of greater public interest, such as pertaining to public law with broader societal welfare impacts. Likewise, depending on host state's adoption of monist or dualist legal systems, its domestic law is likely to be readily embedded with various legal norms of public international law. 174 As one invites these and other contextual factors into the international analytical framework, they are likely to undermine the consistency and predictability of interpretations by international tribunals. This contextual approach, in addition to the introduction of other indeterminate and unrestrained factors through the particular standard of review for each investment obligation, would only appear to be a slippery slope. When an international tribunal provides less deference to a domestic court judgment, it is more susceptible to creating, or further contributing to, a divergence between international and domestic legal norms. Consider, for example, the alternative result where the Eli Lilly tribunal deems the delivers significant value to the international/domestic interactive system. An investment court with an appellate mechanism is likely to facilitate a more coordinated approach to establish consistent principles relating to both standard of review and general deference. It is anticipated that such consistency will serve as a lodestar for other states to follow (or avoid) when establishing their own treaty standards.
This article, however, stops short of defining what the standard of review and deference should be. It is acknowledged that it is difficult to do so in the abstract, without the benefit of a specific factual scenario, just as common law courts have been doing so for centuries. 181 
VI CONCLUSION
The investment court model, as that proposed in the CETA and the EU-Vietnam FTA, carries the potential to have extensive impact. The model establishes a series of features that represents a true paradigm shift of the nature of investor-state dispute settlement, evolving from a model significantly based on private contractual arbitration to that of a public institution.
Indeed, this shift appears to modify the nature of the reciprocal relationship between domestic courts and international tribunals. The Chevron/Ecuador phenomenon demonstrates concerns with finality and the rule of law arising from this dynamic association between domestic and international decision-makers. Ultimately, the nature of this relationship is dependent on the appropriate balance between the desire to administer compliance with international or domestic legal obligations, on the one hand, and to offer a sufficient degree of deference or comity on the other. This relationship already has some established legal benchmarks to work from. In particular, most states are guided by the requirements of the New York Convention when enforcing arbitration agreements and international awards. 182 That stated, the balance of the relationship can be tested, by denouncing or withdrawing from the ICSID Convention (as in the case of Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela), 183 
